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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CHARLES YOUNG WARNER, 
Petitioner/Appellee, 
Appellate Case No. 991031-CA 
vs. 
PATSY EVELYN WARNER, Argument Priority 15 
Respondent/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Relevant statutory provisions are set forth in the addendum to Appellant's brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
This appeal is from a petition brought by the Appellant ("Wife") seeking continuation 
of alimony beyond the date upon which Appellee ("Husband") attained 65 years of age. The 
petition was brought pursuant to a provision in the decree of divorce reading in part: 
ALIMONY. Commencing with the month following entry of the 
Decree of Divorce plaintiff shall pay to defendant, as alimony, the sum of 
$7,917.00 a month (annualized to $95,000.00).... Said alimony obligation 
shall terminate upon any of the following conditions: 
* * * 
(b) At such time as plaintiff reaches the age of 65 if defendant has 
remarried, or if defendant has not remarried and has not filed a petition 
to extend alimony based upon a material change in the financial 
circumstances of the parties. 
* * * 
The petition was tried before District Court Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr. on October 6, 
1999. The Court entered its Ruling on October 26, 1999 and its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order on November 24, 1999. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
To successfully challenge the trial court's factual findings, a party must marshal the 
evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that despite this evidence the trial 
court's findings are against the clear weight of the evidence. 
In challenging a finding of fact of the trial court, [appellant] must 
demonstrate that the finding was clearly erroneous. To demonstrate that a 
finding is clearly erroneous, [appellant] must first marshal all the evidence that 
supports the finding and then demonstrate that despite this evidence the 
finding is so lacking in support as to be "against the clear weight of the 
evidence." This marshaling requirement is a prerequisite to the appellate 
court's examination of the finding. "If the appellant fails to marshal the 
evidence, the appellate court assumes that the record supports the findings of 
the trial court and proceeds to a review of the accuracy of the lower court's 
conclusions of law and application of that law in the case." 
Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citations omitted). 
Instead of marshaling the evidence in support of the trial court's decisions, Wife 
emphasizes the evidence most favorable to her position and largely ignores the contrary 
-2-
evidence. Even when she states the evidence in support of the Findings of Fact she attacks 
its weight and credibility. 
The following statement of facts marshals the evidence to show that the trial court's 
findings were amply supported by evidence in the record and should be accepted. 
At the time the Decree of Divorce was entered in this case, Husband was 53 years of 
age and was employed as a mechanical engineer, consultant, and expert witness in accident 
reconstruction litigation and automobile failure analysis. (R. 313, p. 50-52.) He was also an 
adjunct Professor at Brigham Young University where he had earlier taught full time in the 
Mechanical Engineering Department. (R. 313, p. 50-51.) 
At that time Wife was 51 years of age and unemployed. (R. 297, ^ | 7.) The parties had 
reared five children, all of whom were adults at the time of the divorce. (R. 62, ^3.) 
The Decree of Divorce, entered October 7, 1988, was based on an agreement nego-
tiated by the parties, during which Wife was represented by B.L. Dart and Husband was 
represented by Dennis Ferguson, both experienced matrimonial lawyers. (R. 313, pp. 57-58.) 
Of the marital assets, Wife was awarded $726,529 in value. (R. 64.) Husband was 
awarded $453,706 (R. 64.) Husband assumed all of the family and business debt of 
$311,300.00, as he was the one earning an income. (R. 64.) He also agreed to pay Wife 
alimony of $95,000 per year until he reached age 65. (R. 82-83.) This was so even though 
by Wife's own admission the amount exceeded her need by at least $2,000 per month, and 
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this is before considering the reasonableness of her claimed living expenses. * The provisions 
relative to alimony, as set forth in both the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement 
and the Decree, provide: 
ALIMONY. Commencing with the month following entry of the 
Decree of Divorce plaintiff shall pay to defendant, as alimony, the sum of 
$7,917.00 a month (annualized to $95,000.00) on or before the second day of 
each month. Said alimony obligation shall terminate upon any of the following 
conditions: 
(a) The death of either plaintiff or defendant; 
(b) At such time as plaintiff reaches the age of 65 if defendant has re-
married, or if defendant has not remarried and has not filed a petition 
to extend alimony based upon a material change in the financial 
circumstances of the parties. 
Defendant's entitlement to alimony shall not terminate solely as a result of her 
remarriage. However, if defendant remarries and plaintiffs alimony 
obligation has not previously terminated as herein provide, plaintiff shall have 
the right to petition the Court to modify the alimony award based upon a 
material change in the financial circumstances of the parties as a result of 
defendant's remarriage. (R. 82-83.) 
With respect to the amount of alimony and the provision that it would not auto-
matically terminate upon Wife's remarriage, Husband testified: 
I felt like it was a pretty generous situation, because I took over a lot of 
the debt as the Decree sets forth. The net worth relationships at the time of the 
divorce were much in Pat's favor. 
I took over a lot of debt. I worked hard and I saved money. I lived 
pretty conservatively and I felt like this was an investment kind of to keep us 
1
 Wife's proposed budget at the hearing included indefinite retirement savings of 
$2,000 per month and income tax of $3,143. Retirement is not an appropriate budget item, 
and the income tax was calculated without taking into account deductions or the graduated 
rate structure, and at a higher than actual rate. 
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both happy, and should serve us well to the end of our lives. That's why I 
agreed without a great deal of arm wrestling with the rather large amount that 
was paid monthly. (R. 313, p. 58, lines 12-23.) 
Wife did not intend to seek employment either at the time of divorce or the time of 
hearing upon her petition to modify. (R. 313, p. 40, lines 19-21.) At the time of the divorce, 
Husband was seeking finality. Wife accepted an agreement favorable to her, even permitting 
remarriage without terminating alimony, so that she too could go on with her life. 
About one year after the divorce Wife opened an art gallery in her residence near Zion 
National Park. It failed within six months. (R. 313, p. 42, lines 5-11.) Wife made no further 
effort to supplement her alimony during the ensuing ten years prior to filing her petition. 
(R. 313, p. 20, lines 21-23, p. 42, lines 13-16.) 
Shortly before Husband turned age 65, Wife brought her petition to extend alimony. 
(R. 89-90; 313, pp. 33-34.) By that time Wife had received in excess of $1,000,000 in 
alimony. She claimed five changes in her circumstances: 
1) She had received no money from her interest in CSE (R. 278); 
2) Her art gallery was unsuccessful (R. 278); 
3) She was not employable above minimum wage (R. 278); 
4) She was not able to support herself (R. 278); and 
5) Husband had not retired. (R. 277). 
The trial court considered each alleged change in circumstances separately and found 
none to be a material change in circumstances of the parties. (R. 298-99, If 4.) 
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Wife's principal claimed "change of circumstance" was the failure of the art gallery 
ten years earlier. Actually, everything was pretty much the same as at the time of the divorce 
except that the parties were thirteen years older. Wife was unemployed at the time of the 
divorce and, although employable, was unemployed at the time of the hearing on her petition 
to extend alimony. (R. 313, p. 42.) Her health was essentially the same. (R. 313, pp. 22, 
37.) Her living expenses were overstated in both instances and had not changed. (R. 313, 
p. 42, lines 17-20.) Her "need" was the same. (R. 313, p. 7, lines 22-23.) Husband's 
earnings were similar but not an issue. Wife's assertion that the limited term of alimony was 
based on the assumption that Husband would retire at 65 is contrary to her testimony that she 
did not known when she negotiated the settlement whether Husband would retire at age 65 
or not. (R. 313, p. 34.) 
With respect to the art gallery, the trial judge found that the limited term of the 
alimony awarded was not predicated upon the success or failure of the art gallery: 
The limited term of alimony in the Decree was not premised on the parties' 
expectation that the Respondent's business would be successful. (R. 89-90.) 
Nor did it appear that alimony was intended to simply supplement Respondent's 
income until her art gallery became successful as she continued to live on the same amount 
of alimony and did not file her petition to modify until ten years later. (R. 298, ^ f 6.) 
Based upon this evidence, the trial court correctly concluded that there had been both 
(1) no material change in circumstances since the divorce not foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce, and (2) "no material change in the financial circumstances of the parties," whether 
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or not foreseeable, and denied her petition to continue alimony. (R. 296-97, fflf 1-4.) In its 
Ruling, the court stated: 
The Court finds that none of these situations constitute a substantial material 
change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce, as required 
by the statute. Furthermore, the Court finds that none of these situations even 
rises to the level of a substantial material change in circumstances. Therefore, 
Respondent's Petition fails even under the standard to which the parties' 
stipulated in their Decree. (R. 290.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case came down to whether or not Wife had demonstrated a material change in 
circumstances. The trial court's determination that there was no material change in circum-
stances between the date of the divorce and the date of hearing upon wife's petition is 
supported by the evidence and well within the wide discretion of trial judges in domestic 
relations cases. 
Although Wife claims that an erroneous rule of law was applied in that the Decree of 
Divorce would permit extension of alimony given a material change in the financial circum-
stances of the parties even if foreseeable, there was no need to reach that issue because Wife 
failed to prove a material change of circumstances, foreseeable or not. 
Finally, the original decree in this case, which provided for a limited term of alimony 
which exceeded Wife's claimed need, was based upon agreement of the parties. The limited 
term of alimony was part of the consideration for the excessive payment of alimony. The 
courts should very carefully scrutinize petitions to modify in such circumstances. The policy 
of encouraging settlement will be seriously undermined if petitions to modify may be used 
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to enhance the obligations of a party whose ex-spouse has accepted the benefit of the bargain 
but has come to regret the bargain she made. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT'S DENIAL OF WIFE'S PETITION TO EXTEND THE 
TIME FOR THE PAYMENT OF ALIMONY IS SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE AND THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND IS WITHIN 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION 
The threshold question in this case was whether there was a substantial change in the 
circumstances of the parties: 
It is well-settled in Utah that a party seeking modification of a divorce 
decree has the burden of showing a substantial change in circumstances. It is 
insufficient to show that there has been some change, without a showing that 
such change was substantial. In Lord v. Shaw [682 P.2d 853, 856 (Utah 
1984)], the court found that although "both parties [had] experienced changes 
that could increase or decrease their respective needs and incomes," the 
situation as a whole did not indicate a substantial change requiring 
modification of the divorce decree. 
Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478, 483 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted). 
While the court does retain the equitable power to modify alimony awards, that power 
should be exercised sparingly where, as here, the decree was based upon a contract of 
settlement between the parties. The evidence that the original alimony significantly exceeded 
Wife's need was uncontroverted. Husband agreed to that arrangement in exchange for a 
shorter duration of alimony. The property division favored Wife for the same reason, and 
was an integral part of the overall financial settlement. Now, having received the benefit of 
the contract, Wife asks to be relieved of her own obligation to use those enhanced payments 
to ensure that she could provide for herself after alimony terminated. 
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The courts should very carefully scrutinize petitions to modify under such circum-
stances. The policy of encouraging settlement will be seriously undermined if petitions to 
modify may be used to enhance the obligations of a party whose ex-spouse has accepted the 
benefit of the bargain but has come to regret the bargain she made. 
In this case, the trial court found, based on ample evidence in the record, that Wife 
had failed to demonstrate a substantial change in circumstances. Wife's need was essentially 
the same. Wife's ability to meet that need was unchanged. Her health was no different 
except she was older. She was not employed at the time of the divorce and was not employed 
at the time she filed the petition, although her employability was essentially unchanged. 
Husband's ability to pay was essentially the same but was not an issue as he conceded that 
he had the ability to pay reasonable alimony. 
Wife's alleged continuing need for alimony was essentially of her own making. 
Although she testified that the alimony award had been sufficient to enable her to save 
$2,000 per month, she loaned $220,000 on an interest-free basis to her son for purchase of 
a home. She also paid private school tuition for a grandchild (R. 313, pp. 32) and otherwise 
acted as though her agreement for a limited term of alimony would never end. 
In this case, by Wife's own testimony, the amount of alimony was $2,000 more than 
needed and was in effect money she expected to save for her retirement (R. 313, pp. 43-44), 
thus making the alimony more like an annuity than alimony. 
Wife's claim that she has not realized any money from the award of stock in CSE is 
a complaint about the property division, which is not subject to modification. Despain v. 
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Despain, 627 P.2d 526, 527 (Utah 1981). Wife, however, never tried to sell the stock. 
(R. 313, pp. 15-18.) IfWife has a complaint about the way CSEhas treated her it is with the 
officers and directors of CSE. Husband is not an officer or director of CSE. The business 
is a family business and until recently the parties' son was its president. (R. 313, pp. 47-48.) 
In his opening statement counsel for wife said: 
The most critical [change of circumstance] being at the time of the entry of the 
decree she [Wife] had started an art gallery and planned on making her living 
through the art gallery. It failed within six months . . . . (R. 313, pp. 6-7.) 
This is not true. The art gallery came later, a year or two after the Decree. At the time 
of the divorce, it was not a circumstance. It was at most a hope. This was amply 
demonstrated by Wife's failure to seek modification of the decree until ten years after the 
gallery failed. Wife also failed to seek other employment after the gallery failed: 
Q Why did you not pursue employment? 
A The answer may seem very odd, but living in an area where the 
income is between $6 and $8 a month [sic] and it's seasonal work, I would be 
taking from someone who had no income and contributing a small amount to 
a substantial amount of income that I had. I didn't think this was a fair thing 
to do to a human being, to my neighbors. (R. 313, pp. 20-21.) 
This is compelling evidence that Wife did not view supplemental income as an important 
component of the parties' agreement. 
At the conclusion of the evidence Wife argued five changed circumstances. The trial 
court addressed each in its Ruling and in the Findings of Fact and concluded, "There has 
been no material change in the financial circumstances of the parties." (R. 297, f^ 2.) 
That finding is supported by substantial evidence in the record as set forth above. 
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A trial court's decision concerning modification of a divorce decree will 
not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Moreover, "it is the burden of 
the party seeking modification of a divorce decree to demonstrate that there 
has been a substantial change in circumstances that justifies modification." 
Grouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 838 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted). Wife has 
failed to demonstrate that the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence, and thus 
has failed to demonstrate abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the trial court's findings should 
be affirmed. 
II. THE RESULT WOULD BE NO DIFFERENT UNDER THE LAN-
GUAGE OF THE DECREE OR THE CASE LAW 
Wife argues that the Court imposed an improper limitation on her opportunity to 
obtain an extension of alimony by requiring her to prove that the change of circumstances 
was not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. The trial court's decision was based on failure 
to prove a change in circumstances. Foreseeability was not the controlling issue. 
Furthermore, the court finds that none of these situations even rises to the level 
of a substantial material change in circumstances. Therefore, Respondent's 
Petition fails even under the standard to which the parties stipulated in their 
Decree. (R. 298-99, f^ 4 .) 
This was however the case law at the time of the divorce as stated in Naylor v. Naylor, 
700 P.2d 707 (Utah 1985), and was the case law urged upon the court by Wife at the trial. 
(R. 313, pp. 62-63.) 
It is unnecessary to argue about whether the change was foreseeable under Naylor or 
contemplated in the Decree under Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App. 47, 997 P.2d 903. 
Those questions were not reached as there was no change in the financial circumstances of 
the parties. 
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Nor is there a need to consider Wife's constitutional issues. She argues that the 
Decree states the test for continuation of alimony (Brief p. 12). The simple answer is the 
court applied that test as well and found it made no difference. (R. 290.) 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Trial Court is based on the evidence, reflected in the Findings, and 
supported by the established statutory and case law and should be affirmed. 
DATED this "?J flay of June, 2000. 
SNOW, CHRiSTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Harold G. Christensen 
Rodney R. Parker 
Heather S. White 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee 
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